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Abstract the intention of this research is to elaborate on Socrates’ philosophy 
and its serious consequences for the relationship between philosophy and politics, 
hence making them hostile to each other, and Socrates an enemy of the people. 
the author explores the tension between philosophy and public life by comparing 
and contrasting two opposing philosophical projects – Socrates and Plato’s – while 
illuminating different methods and paths they follow in their understanding of 
philosophy and politics. Since the author makes a claim that Socrates’ philosophy is 
anti-political and subversive, perceived useless for public life and leading to politi-
cal instability, it tragically fails when confronted with political power, as Plato sub-
tly reveals in the dialogues. On the contrary, Plato’s political project, regardless of 
its own contradictions, failures and turnovers, represents a radical shift. it is the 
project of re-founding the city on the new political grounds, attempting to make 
philosophy political, and the city safe for philosophy by permanently looking for a 
modus vivendi between philosophy and politics.
Keywords philosophy, anti-political, subversive, instability, Socrates, Plato
Five years before the trial and death 
of Socrates, namely in 404 BCE, Athens 
was defeated after two and half decades 
of war with Sparta. Yet, this was not only 
a demise of the Athenian Empire as a 
supreme naval force of the Hellenistic 
world. More importantly, this foreign 
policy and military debacle disintegrat-
ed Athenian democracy. Political tur-
moil and insecurity infested the inner 
domain exposing the ultimate fragility 
of Athenian democratic institutions. 
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These decades of war and instability co-
incide with the influence of Socrates and 
his philosophizing on life in Athens. For 
many, this type of philosophizing – its 
method, its influence, along with its 
visual appearance embodied in Socrates’ 
lifestyle as well as the lifestyle of his fol-
lowers – has been perceived subversive 
and thus responsible for weakening and 
destabilizing political institutions mak-
ing him a notorious figure of public life. 
Both Socrates’ own contempt and irony 
toward politics and politicians, as well as 
his image in the public, even among 
some of his close acquaintances, opened 
up the conflict between philosophy and 
politics, or public life in general. For ex-
ample, in the Gorgias Socrates makes a 
radical statement that “we don’t know 
any man who has proved to be good at 
politics in this city” (Gorgias, 517a), or 
that “those who profess to be politicians 
are just like those who profess to be 
sophists” (Gorgias, 519c). In the Sympo­
sium even Alcibiades, his lover and an 
admirer, articulates the public percep-
tion of Socrates according to which 
Socrates is full of contempt toward all 
values, goods, and people of the city: 
“You can’t imagine how little he cares 
whether a person is beautiful, or rich, or 
famous in any other way that most peo-
ple admire. He considers all these pos-
sessions beneath contempt, and that’s 
exactly how he considers us as well. In 
public, I tell you, his whole life is one big 
game – a game of irony” (Symposium, 
216e).
Taking all these into an account, we 
should reexamine Socrates’ philosophi-
cal project by putting an emphasis on its 
political consequences. Actually, his phi-
losophizing will be taken as a paradigm 
for understanding the relationship be-
tween philosophy and public life in the 
context of democratic institutions and 
practices, and as such we will be explor-
ing the tensions between philosophy and 
politics and where these tensions are 
coming from. Therefore, I am going to 
review Socrates’ philosophical project 
from the standpoint of its contribution 
to political instability. In order to under-
stand this problem better, we should ac-
tually differentiate between two projects 
– the one of Socrates and the other of 
Plato. Unlike Socrates’ anti-political and 
subversive project, it should be empha-
sized that Plato’s political project is the 
project of re-founding the city on the 
new political grounds, thus being inher-
ently political and aiming toward mak-
ing the city safe for philosophy by push-
ing toward a modus vivendi between 
philosophy and public life. Was Plato 
successful in doing that? We will discuss 
that later.
The end of the Theaetetus is reveal-
ing. Plato is not just telling the story in 
retrospect since the Theaetetus belongs 
to the late dialogues, but the time setting 
of the philosophical discussion between 
Socrates and Theaetetus is placed before 
his trial in the court of Athens. “I must 
go”, Socrates concludes the conversation, 
“to the King’s Porch to meet the indict-
ment that Meletus has brought against 
me” (Theaetetus, 210d). We are suggest-
ed that philosophizing is willy-nilly in-
terrupted due to the matters of public 
importance. The tension between philo-
sophical and political life is implied: 
Socrates has to interrupt his philoso-
phizing even though his commitment to 
philosophy is in stark opposition to the 
superficiality of public affairs. Namely, 
he could not care less about the public 
matters. Yet, he has to descend, so to 
speak, to the “cave” of public life to face 
the charges, and even more tragically, he 
is able to anticipate that the cave ‘beast’ 




































will seal off his destiny.1 Out of this trau-
matic experience for Socrates, Plato will 
try to bridge the gap between philoso-
phy and public life – “the nonphilosoph-
ic orientation of the city” and thus its 
hostility toward philosophy (Bloom, 
1991:310). Therefore, we will see that the 
ideal of the Socratic way of life is not the 
same as the one Plato suggests in the 
Republic and elsewhere in his later writ-
ings, thus making us aware that we are 
dealing with two different ‘Socrates’ – 
the historic and the Platonic one.2 Pre-
1 “Descending” is a fundamental overall mo-
tive of Platonic philosophy. It can be notices 
from the very beginniing of the Republic – 
the very first word is kateben (‘I went down’) 
embodying strong symbolism of either bring-
 ing the light of knowledge into the darkness 
of socio-political reality, or the hardship of 
the whole epistemic journey someone has to 
take. This symbolism of descending as well 
as of rising is running throughout the whole 
text. For additional readings on this motive 
see, for example: Miller, 1995; Vogelin, 2000, 
Howland, 2004; Altman, 2013. Moreover, 
this motive is fundamental for the whole 
tradition of Western literature and philoso-
phy starting from Homer’s Odyssey where 
Odesseyus has to travel down Hades, to 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra where 
this motive is clearly depicted in the figure 
of Zarathustra who “must descend to the 
depths” and “bring the light to the under-
world”, namely to “go under – go down” 
to man “to whom I want to descend” 
(Nietzsche, 1978:10).
2 It would be an interpretative slippery slope 
to make any assumptions about the histori-
cisity of Socrates having in mind that Plato’s 
dialogues are a literary form and the charac-
ters Plato introduces should be treated in the 
same way. Yet, if we take one of the early dia-
logues such as the Apology, we can notice 
that this dialogue resembles the historical 
trial of Socrates similarly presented by Xen-
ophon as well. But it would be mistaken to 
argue that even these early dialogues should 
be treated as the historical record of actual 
conversations (Nightingale, 1995; Ruther-
cisely, as historical Socrates from the 
early dialogues, the one practicing cross- 
examination (elenchus) of his interlocu-
tors gradually fades away, the Platonic 
Socrates takes his place in the middle 
dialogues, resulting in changing of the 
relationship between politics and phi-
losophy.
ford, 1995; Kahn, 1996; Blondell, 2002; Gi-
annopolou, 2013). However, the difference 
between two figures – the so-called histori-
cal Socrates and the Platonic Socrates can be 
established. First, there are fundamental dif-
ferences between the two figures of Socrates 
– the differences that actually envision dif-
ferent projects Plato writes about. As Vlastos 
pointed out, Plato throughout his early writ-
ings “remains convinced of the substantial 
truth of Socrates’ teaching and the sound-
ness of its method” (Vlastos, 1991:53). After 
that period this is not the case anymore. For 
example, it looks like in the Gorgias, but es-
pecially from the book II of the Republic we 
have “another” Socrates speaking (I disagree 
with Vlastos about positioning the Gorgias 
in the early dialogues). On the one hand, in 
the Gorgias we still have the elenchus in 
which Socrates tries to cross-examine his in-
terlocutors, along with the aporetic con-
struction of the dialogue. On the other 
hand, unlike the benevolent Euthyphro, here 
in the Gorgias these interlocutors became 
more hostile to Socrates, and Socrates more 
convinced to defend a certain conception of 
knowledge, life and philosophy, but also try-
ing to reinterpret the domain of practicing 
politics. But the fundamental discrepancy 
between these two figures of Socrates devel-
ops from the book II of the Republic to the 
last Plato’s dialogue. Aside from establishing 
his own metaphysics, Plato will only use the 
figure of Socrates to pursue his own articula-
tion of the philosophical as well as the polit-
ical program. This political dimension of 
Plato’s writings (especially articulated through 
the foundation of the state and the institu-
tional/educational settings aiming to make 
the city safe for philosophy, if not completely 
inconceivable for the historical Socrates) is 

























As already mentioned, I would like 
to argue that, unlike Plato’s foundational 
political project, Socrates’ philosophical 
project is fundamentally anti-political, 
and as such it was perceived odious to 
the majority of Athenians, and Socrates 
himself was a figure whose sophistry was 
cunning as well as subversive for the city. 
In other words, to understand Plato’s 
foundational political project deployed 
in the Republic, it is necessary to first 
look back at the Socratic project – name-
ly, its anti-foundational and anti-politi-
cal dimensions. In order to do so, we 
would need to rethink the political ram-
ifications of Socrates’ cross-examination 
activities, namely his elenchus as a 
method of searching for truth by ques-
tioning all the epistemological founda-
tions. Precisely, would it be possible to 
make a claim that the method itself, the 
elenchus, made the city more vulnerable 
in the new political circumstances than 
ever before? Was it the clash between 
Athens on the one side searching for a 
firm ground, an anchor, and Socrates, on 
the other side, whose questioning was 
perceived as anchorless, corrupting, 
and politically and morally subversive? 
Namely, if Socratic elenchus pushes the 
instability of individual moral convic-
tions, the political order, especially if 
haunted by the fear of political instabili-
ty, may consider this elenchus as well as 
those practicing it as dangerous. In order 
to protect certain metaphysical and po-
litical foundations, the political order 
cannot rest on permanent dismantling 
of someone’s moral universe. Hence, the 
trial and death of Socrates represent the 
end of his epistemological project be-
cause this project, as I mentioned, was 
not foundational while, at the same time, 
it was perceived as subversive and dan-
gerous to the city. Plato will draw on that 
lesson realizing that philosopher’s crav-
ing for truth embodied in the Socratic 
project is incompatible with the de-
mands of public life. However, Plato will 
offer a reinterpretation of the role that 
philosophy has to play in public life in 
his Republic. Philosophy needs particu-
lar social settings in order to flourish; 
otherwise it is likely to perish. Its consti-
tution is fragile, thus not properly 
equipped to grapple with the democratic 
“beast”.
Therefore, in the argument that will 
follow I am going to show first why 
Socrates’ philosophy should be consid-
ered as anti-political as well as politically 
subversive. Additionally I will show why 
Plato’s political project, although politi-
cally subversive for another reason – 
namely, for Plato’s flirting with the Spar-
tan educational training and program-
ming – is the final blow to the Socratic 
philosophy, but also an attempt to re-
draw the line between philosophy and 
politics by re-founding the city and 
making it safe for philosophy.
Anti-political and subversive 
philosophizing
About fifty years after the death of 
Socrates, Aeshines, the Athenian orator 
and politician, in his speech against 
 Timarchus said that Athenians “put 
Socrates the sophist to death because he 
was shown to have educated Critias, one 
of the Thirty who overthrew the democ-
racy” (Aeschines, 2001:112). The per-
ception given about Socrates in this 
speech is indicative for two reasons. 
First, Socrates is marked as a sophist. 
Second, and even more important, 
Socrates’ philosophic influence has been 
perceived as subversive for the Athenian 
democracy. It is interesting that these 
views endured for more than fifty years 




































Moreover, such views had been present 
for at least a couple of decades before the 
trial. Namely, Aristophanes had depict-
ed Socrates as a sophist and trickster in 
the Clouds (Aristophanes, 1998), about 
twenty years before Socrates was con-
victed. In the Apology this argument re-
appears showing that Socrates has a 
reputation of a person who “turns the 
weaker argument into the stronger, and 
teaches other to do the same” (Apology, 
19c, 18c). Yet, these indictments about 
the sophistry of Socrates hardly made 
sense since no other sophist was put on a 
trial for simply being a sophist. Rather, it 
is my argument that the accusation 
about sophistry was politically motivat-
ed aiming to put an end to the subversive 
effects of Socrates’ philosophizing on 
public life. These subversive effects were 
manifested in destabilizing people’s 
dominant views about morality, in abol-
ishing Athenian democracy, and in 
turning young people (such as the Athe-
nian general Alcibiades) against their 
own institutions.
What I would like to argue is that 
Socrates is the anti-political hero par 
excellance. In the Greek tradition the 
best known anti-political figures are lit-
erary (and paradigmatic) characters 
such are Achilles or Antigone. Socrates 
belongs to that anti-political tradition as 
well. As is the case with both Achilles 
and Antigone, Socrates is guided by the 
transcendent imperative beyond com-
munal life, and each type of such zealot-
ry is characterized by inflexibility and 
fulfillment of one’s own duty, destiny, 
and mission whose ultimate end is 
death, not political community whatso-
ever. Precisely, Socrates refers to himself 
in a theological and even eschatological 
manner as, for example, a servant of god 
that brings the greatest good for the city 
(Apology, 30a), a gift of god (Apology, 
30d-31b), a person who is on a mission 
led by god (Apology, 33c), and who can-
not do otherwise because “that would 
mean disobeying my god” (Apology, 
37e-38a). On top of that, and perhaps 
even more problematically, Socrates’ 
view of philosophy and philosophizing 
in the Phaedo is death-oriented, or 
life-averted: “…the one aim of those who 
practice philosophy in the proper man-
ner is to practice for dying and death” 
(Phaedo, 64a); they should “keep away 
from all bodily passions”, and as such 
“they do not travel the same road” 
(Phaedo, 82cd) with other nonphilo-
sophic creatures. For Socrates it is his 
mission – a pursuit of truth that is more 
important than the whole society – an 
unexamined life is not worth living 
(Apology, 38a). Hence, all those nonphil-
osophic ways of life are going to be op-
posed to the standards of life worth liv-
ing for Socrates. In that case, we have an 
irreconcilable conflict or an open frac-
ture between philosophy and public life.
In Plato’s early dialogues Socrates is 
a public figure. It is important to notice a 
stark difference between the setting of 
these dialogues and that of the later 
ones. The early dialogues take place in 
the public, while the later ones are con-
fined to the private discussions inside 
the house walls of the discussants. Un-
like the “Platonic” Socrates, the “histor-
ic” Socrates is someone willing to discuss 
ethical and philosophical issues with all 
of his fellow citizens regardless of their 
status in the polis: “I offer myself for 
questioning to the wealthy and the poor 
alike, and to anyone who may wish to 
answer in response to questions from 
me” (Apology, 33b). Yet, Socrates’ desire 
to discuss these issues in the public is far 
from the conclusion that he shared the 
same enthusiasm about being involved 
in public affairs. Interestingly, the only 
























engaged with and praised for are mili-
tary campaigns. Laches, the Athenian 
general and one of the leaders of the 
Athenian army, after the catastrophic 
defeat by the Boeotians at Delium in No-
vember 424 BCE said that Socrates was 
bravely defending his family’s reputation 
as well as “that of his country. He 
marched with me in the retreat from 
Delium, and I can tell you that if the rest 
had been willing to behave in the same 
manner, our city would be safe and we 
would not then have suffered a disaster 
of that kind” (Laches, 181b). But aside 
from being praised for his valor in com-
bat, Socrates did not participate in other 
public and political business whatsoever, 
having no respect for them. As I pointed 
out, for Socrates, philosophy is funda-
mentally an anti-political project. It is 
most clearly expressed in the Apology 
where the public domain has been per-
ceived as inherently hostile to philoso-
phy and thus, in order not to perish ear-
ly, someone has to be led by his own 
sense of meaning that resides beyond 
the political sphere, namely that which 
transcends it. In Socrates’case this was a 
divine or a spiritual sign that manifests 
itself as an inner voice: “This is what op-
poses my engaging in politics – and its 
opposition is an excellent thing, to my 
mind; because you may be quite sure, 
fellow Athenians, that if I had tried to 
engage in politics, I should have per-
ished long since and should have been of 
no use either to you or to myself ” (Apol­
ogy, 31de). The conclusion that follows 
reveals a complete anti-political nature 
of his philosophical project – it is not a 
matter of choice, but the existential dic-
tum for a philosopher not to engage in 
public life. Socrates pointed out that 
during his defense:
please do not get angry if I tell you the 
truth. The fact is that there is no person 
on earth whose life will be spared by you 
or by any other majority, if he is genu-
inely opposed to many injustices and 
unlawful acts, and tries to prevent their 
occurrence in our city. Rather, anyone 
who truly fights for what is just, if he is 
going to survive for even a short time, 
must act in a private capacity rather than 
in a public one (Apology, 31e-32a).
Philosophical search for truth and 
justice are in stark opposition with the 
nonphilosophic desires of the masses 
willing to accept only those views that 
please them the most, or those that rein-
force their beliefs and pursuits. This an-
ti-political stance fits perfectly with the 
view of philosophy as “training for dy-
ing” expressed in the Phaedo (Phaedo, 
67e). Accordingly, as philosophy is in-
herently anti-political, its anti-political 
trajectory will sooner or later hit the reef 
of political reality and it is going to sink. 
Namely, every public engagement taken 
by Socrates was an omen of the failure of 
his philosophical project. For example, 
by examining the politicians Socrates 
concludes that they were impotent in 
acquiring the truth, and thus, since they 
were not living an examined life, they 
needed to be despised. According to 
Socrates, they operated in the world of 
shadows or opinions, thinking they pos-
sessed the truth, but being deluded by 
their false beliefs: “I formed the opinion 
that, although the man was thought to 
be wise by many other people, and espe-
cially by himself, yet in reality he was 
not. So I then tried to show him that he 
thought himself wise without being so. I 
thereby earned his dislike” (Apology, 
21cd). The same happened when he had 
tried to find wisdom among other social 
groups – the poets and the craftsmen. 
Therefore, philosophical dwelling, due 
to its imprinted drive for challenging 




































endangered and cannot take roots in this 
setting.
The problem can be formulated as 
following: either the city, namely the 
public domain is unsuitable for philoso-
phy, or philosophy is unsuitable for the 
city. I suggest that Plato tragically, argues 
both, despite his attempts to make phi-
losophy political. Before discussing Pla-
to’s political project, let me explain fur-
ther a few fundamental problems of the 
Socratic philosophizing regarding its re-
lation to public life. There are two funda-
mental traits of Socrates’ philosophical 
project resulting from its anti-political 
framework: first, it is the method itself, 
elenchus – the very foundation and a 
recognizable feature of Socrates’ cross- 
examination – that has been perceived 
as politically subversive and leading to 
instability, thus making his philosophy 
irreconcilable with public life; and sec-
ond, philosophy has been viewed as ill-
equipped for public life, not merely be-
cause every philosopher fails when ex-
posed to the whims of political power, 
but also because he is seen as useless for 
political community. I will elaborate on 
these in detail.
Elenchus and instability
Socratic elenchus (ἔλεγχος) is a dia-
lectical method of cross-examination in 
which inconsistencies of arguments 
among interlocutors have to be exposed 
in order to get closer to the truth since it 
claims to be the final arbiter of moral 
truth; yet the whole elenctic enterprise 
cannot yield certainty, and hence ends 
up in aporia. The only prerequisite for 
participating in the elenchus is open- 
mindedness – “the questioner must fol-
low wherever the person questioned 
may lead him” (Euthyphro, 14c) – and an 
uncompromised seriousness regarding 
someone’s beliefs – an interlocutor has 
to express his own sincere belief about a 
topic of discussion, not anyone else’s.3 
For instance, Socrates pushes Crito to 
disregard the “popular opinion regard-
ing just, honorable, or good actions” 
(Crito, 48a) in order to hear Crito’s own 
account on these things. However, in the 
Laches Nicias discloses to Lysimachus a 
hidden agenda of Socratic elenctic 
method:
You don’t appear to me to know that 
whoever comes into close contact with 
Socrates and associates with him in con-
versation must necessarily, even if he 
began by conversing about something 
quite different in the first place, keep on 
being led about by the man’s arguments 
until he submits to answering questions 
about himself concerning both his pres-
ent manner of life and the life he has 
lived hitherto (Laches, 187e).
Hence, when faced with Socrates, a 
person is subjected to a “rigorous test” – 
of his knowledge, and his ability to justi-
fy his way of life. At the end of the day, 
this person will be exposed in all his 
epistemic nakedness. However, Nicias 
suggested that the benefits of Socratic 
cross-examination override the condi-
tion of perplexity you might be slipped 
into while providing a detailed account 
of your life. “I don’t think there’s any 
harm in being reminded of flaws in our 
past or present behavior”, Nicias says. 
“On the contrary, in the future you’re 
bound to be more thoughtful if you don’t 
avoid this treatment but submit to it…
3 For example Vlastos clarifies: “Socratic elen-
chus is a search for moral truth by question- 
and-answer adversary argument in which a 
thesis is debated only if asserted as the an-
swerer’s own belief and is regarded as refut-
ed only if its negation is deducted from his 
























and expect to go on learning as long as 
you live…Anyway, in my view being ex-
amined by Socrates isn’t at all odd or 
unpleasant” (Laches, 188b). But such a 
positive attitude toward Socrates’ elen-
chus was endemic. Quite contrary, this 
method was perceived as fundamentally 
destabilizing for the majority, and 
Socrates as a trickster and ironist who 
“plays” with his interlocutors. In the Re­
public Thrasymachus accuses Socrates 
for being inherently cunning: “I even 
told these others earlier that you would 
be unwilling to answer, that you would 
be ironic and do anything rather than 
give an answer, if someone questioned 
you”(Republic, 337a). Moreover, for 
Thrasymachus, anyone willing to submit 
to Socratic cross-examination should be 
considered as naïve if he is not aware of 
Socrates’ cunning strategy. According to 
his view, Socrates indulges himself in 
asking questions while making you per-
plexed. In other words, instead of mak-
ing you better or improved, Socrates left 
you corrupted. Therefore, we have two 
different impressions about the effects of 
Socrates’ cross-examinations. Yet, both 
views have something in common: be-
ing exposed to Socrates will leave your 
character somewhat transformed. 
Socrates appears as knowing nothing at 
all, yet he was the only one able to make 
a way of life out of this premise, while his 
discussants were usually uncomfortable 
with the outcome of their conversation. 
For example, in the Euthyphro the elen-
chus leads to the interlocutor’s perplexi-
ty and aggravation. Socrates, while hav-
ing his own case in the court pending, 
starts an unexpected dialogue with Eu-
thyphro who came to the court to put 
charges against his own father for impi-
ous actions. The whole conversation will 
become not only an exhausting search 
for a definition of piety, but more impor-
tantly, an exposé of Euthyphro’s way of 
life. Precisely, when Euthyphro defines 
piety as obedience to the law – “prose-
cuting wrongdoers” (Euthyphro, 5e) – he 
will back up his definition with a 
transcendent argument by deriving his 
convictions from the religious stories 
about gods. Socrates is going to unveil 
all the inconsistencies of such an argu-
ment. This procedure will be repeated 
for a while aiming toward an improved 
definition of piety. However, the equilib-
rium between the interlocutor’s inner 
beliefs and the universal definition of 
piety will not be reached, ever. Even 
though Socrates asked for Euthyphro’s 
perseverance in their open quest for a 
definition of piety, at the end of the day, 
Euthyphro abandons the conversation. 
On top of that, Socrates was not helpful 
in providing a proper definition of piety 
since it was not the goal of his elenchus.4 
Actually, Socrates would never be able to 
give the answer anyway since, according 
to his own admission, he lacks the 
knowledge to do so. In other words, Eu-
thyphro should be able to find the an-
swer by himself. For Socrates the meth-
od of cross-examination possesses an 
intrinsic value, not an instrumental one. 
The goal of Socratic elenchus is not to 
secure a certain definition of moral ex-
cellence – the destination is unknown, 
its value is an open dialectic encounter. 
These dialectical encounters allow an 
insight into the ambiguities of human 
knowledge. The purpose of Socratic el-
enctic method was to reveal these ambi-
guities by trying to show that the origins 
of human actions rest on the false un-
4 Yet, according to Vlastos, Socrates “has been 
doing his best to lead Euthyphro to the point 
where he could see for himself the right 
answer. What he positively refuses to do is to 





































derstanding of knowledge. Nevertheless, 
he never provides a straightforward rec-
ipe from his elenctic gridlock. Thus, the 
dialogue ends up in aporia, and the in-
terlocutor is displaced from his epistem-
ic certainty.
The problem is that the elenchus did 
not render Euthyphro happier or more 
virtuous. It attempted to destabilize his 
moral universe, and as such it appears 
potentially destructive for anyone who 
holds certain moral convictions opposed 
to the way of life Socrates advocates for. 
In the Meno we have additional proof of 
such dubious and destabilizing effects of 
the elenchus. Meno says: “Socrates, be-
fore I even met you I used to hear that 
you are always in a state of perplexity 
and that you bring others to the same 
state, and now I think you are bewitch-
ing and beguiling me, simply putting me 
under a spell, so that I am quite per-
plexed (Meno, 80a). In other words, the 
method itself is presented as politically 
and morally subversive. On top of that, 
Meno adds an astonishing statement 
that echoes the tragic events of the trial 
of Socrates: “…for if you were to behave 
like this as a stranger in another city, you 
would be driven away for practicing sor-
cery” (Meno, 80b). We cannot be sure if 
actually Meno implied that Athens had 
been tolerating Socrates being subver-
sive for a while out of its love for free-
dom, or out of its weakness. What we 
can be sure about is that Socrates’ meth-
od of investigations turns out to be cor-
rupting. Namely, according to the charg-
es in the Apology, there are at least two 
possible scenarios: either your moral 
grounds will be displaced and not sub-
stituted with any formative content while 
leaving you without any moral compass; 
or/and you will spread the seed of 
Socrates’ corruptive influence by prac-
ticing the very same method to others. 
In his defense Socrates wanted to refute 
these charges by claiming no aspirations 
and capabilities to be someone’s teacher 
(Apology, 19e, 20a). Yet, this argument 
makes no difference concerning the ac-
cusations for him being subversive. The 
only way to get out of this quandary for 
Socrates is to show that he was not sub-
versive intentionally: “if I am corrupting 
them unintentionally, the law does not 
require me to be brought to court for 
such mistakes, but rather to be taken 
aside for private instruction and admo-
nition – since I shall obviously stop do-
ing unintentional damage, if I learn bet-
ter” (Apology, 26a). However, it is hardly 
believable that Socrates was not aware of 
the consequences of his influence. He 
knew about his reputation for decades. 
Actually, Socrates admits that he was 
gradually becoming ‘the enemy of the 
people’ by practicing his method of 
cross-examination in the public: “I real-
ized, with dismay and alarm, that I was 
making enemies” (Apology, 21e). He 
adds too: “You, my fellow citizens, were 
unable to put up with my discourses and 
arguments, but they were so irksome 
and odious to you that you now seek to 
be rid of them” (Apology, 37cd). Indeed. 
But he could not do any other way. On 
the one hand, according to Socrates a 
genuine philosopher has to be “some 
sort of gadfly,” a zealot, who radically 
questions and challenges social institu-
tions along with the existing ways of liv-
ing (Apology, 31a). On the other hand, 
he perceived his elenchus as an instru-
ment of god’s will. He says: “That is why, 
even to this day, I still go about seeking 
out and searching into anyone I believe 
to be wise, citizen or foreigner, in obedi-
ence to the god. Then, as soon as I find 
someone is not wise, I assist the god by 
proving that he is not” (Apology, 23b). 
























god’s will Socrates talks about is in op-
position to the city, or that Socrates is 
blasphemous because of praising some 
of his own gods, or because “failing to 
acknowledge the gods acknowledged by 
the city” (Apology, 24c). Either way, this 
was understood as subversive – morally 
and politically – and as such contribut-
ing to political instability during the 
fragile times for Athens. Socrates’ at-
tempt to show the falseness of these ac-
cusations by trying to portray them as 
illogical and inconsistent is ill-conceived 
and weak. By using the “horse example” 
he claims that one person is not able to 
corrupt alone: “Do you think the same is 
true of horses? Is it everybody who im-
proves them, while a single person spoils 
them? Or isn’t the opposite true: a single 
person…namely the horse-trainers, can 
improve them; while lay people spoil 
them…? (Apology, 25b). However, the 
analogy can be inverted – one person 
can be well trained and so influential, 
and as such responsible for spoiling oth-
ers even though there were many trying 
to improve them.5 Socrates does not 
provide a convincing argument to disre-
gard such an inverted conclusion.6
Yet, it would be a long shot to blame 
elenchus only for political destabiliza-
tion. Socrates’ closer friends did not 
mind being confronted during his cross- 
examination. As mentioned, Nicias was 
one literal example, the other was, for 
5 Similarly, in Ibsen’s play An Enemy of the 
People one character, the doctor, has been 
accused of doing damage to the city by dis-
covering certain unpleasant truths. 
6 In addition, he puts himself in contradiction 
imagining himself as someone profoundly 
trained for his mission by making a parallel 
with the horse-trainers. However, he could 
neither provide any certificate to prove his 
excellence, nor could he do that due to his 
disavowal of knowledge.
example, Polemarchus in the book I of 
the Republic. Although destabilized 
through the elenchus, Polemarchus ac-
cepted his defeat and became willing to 
follow Socrates in his elenctic search 
saying: “I, for my part, am willing to be 
your partner in the battle” (Republic, 
335e). Both characters were admiring 
Socrates’ wit in discussion. However, for 
some of Socrates’ followers the elenchus 
was a vehicle for bashing the Athenian 
institutions. But it was not the elenchus 
itself that should be held responsible for 
Socrates’ subversiveness. For decades 
Socrates was publicly perceived as a con-
cealed admirer of Sparta. His visual ap-
pearance was flirting with the “Spartan” 
lifestyle – long hair, self-deprivation of 
food and hygiene in order to prove one’s 
own endurance, etc. It is not surprising 
that 15 years before the trial, Aristo-
phanes in his Birds equalized those 
young admirers of Sparta with Socrates: 
“all men were mad for Sparta—with long 
hair, they went around half starved and 
never washed, like Socrates—and carry-
ing knobbed sticks” (Aristophanes, 
2008: 82 [1280]).7  Some of them, like 
the Athenian general Alcibiades, as 
mentioned, later betrayed Athens for 
Sparta, while Critias became a tyrant re-
sponsible for massive killings of his fel-
low Athenians. In other words, Socrates 
7 In his study of Socrates’ life, Luis Navia em-
phasizes that all of the followers of Socrates 
wore long hair to display their admiration 
for Sparta (Navia, 2007:69). Although Plato 
as well sympathizes with certain features of 
the Spartan system, his commentary about 
the necessity for legislating visual appear-
ance and behavior in his ideal polis includes 
a subtle criticism of Socrates’ “Spartan” ap-
pearance. Namely, young people would have 
to abide by the state’s prescribed outlook – 
“styles; clothing; shoes; the general appear-





































influenced some of the most notorious 
enemies of the Athenian democracy. He 
was aware that his cross-examinations 
triggered discontent among the many, 
leaving others morally debased, and as 
such contributing to the overall political 
instability. This is why he was held indi-
rectly responsible for providing a fertile 
soil for the anti-democratic processes in 
Athens – the rise of the rule of the Thirty 
Tyrants in particular. Aside from taking 
the legalist position in the Crito and ac-
cepting the legal penalty, Socrates, if not 
intentionally subversive, was unsuccess-
ful in teaching how to be a good man 
and good citizen at once. His stance in 
the Crito can be seen not only as a justi-
fication of his personal quandary – the 
acceptance of his own defeat in front of 
his fellow Athenians – but also a philo-
sophical checkmate of his project. After 
all, if the people were left debased and 
perplexed after the elenchus, if he was 
not able to define the content of moral 
excellence, if he did not feel any respon-
sibility about the effects of his cross-ex-
aminations, and, if out of this irresponsi-
bility the very foundation of Athens was 
shaken and faced with the enemies of 
democracy, he should be considered rea-
sonably responsible having his public 
influence in mind. Therefore, if not a 
harbinger of the Athenian fall, for many 
he appeared politically amoral or lacking 
political and moral sensibility in the 
whole political context. In that respect, 
the trial against Socrates was a trial 
against a figure that turned out to be a 
threat to fragile Athenian democracy. 
Being personally accountable or not, 
with his cross-examinations contribut-
ing to a greater or lesser degree to desta-
bilizing the city, Socrates’ philosophizing 
was not perceived as harmless. Interest-
ingly, what his enemies and many fol-
lowers had in common is the view that 
this philosophizing was useless for pub-
lic life. Having in mind all of these, Plato 
will become a decisive figure in disman-
tling Socrates’ philosophical legacy.
Uselessness of philosophy  
and political power
The most famous excerpt from the 
Republic is about philosopher-kings. 
Namely, Plato’s epic announcement: 
“Until philosophers rule as kings in their 
cities, or those who are nowadays called 
kings and leading men become genuine 
and adequate philosophers, so that po-
litical power and philosophy become 
thoroughly blended together… cities 
will have no rest from evils… nor, I 
think, will the human race” (Republic, 
473cd). One fundamental implication of 
that statement can be noticed immedi-
ately – if compared with Socrates, Plato 
makes a radical change regarding the 
relationship between philosophy and 
public life suggesting that practicing 
philosophy becomes a prerequisite for 
public betterment. However, such a 
statement is puzzling if we have in mind 
the shadow of Socrates over Athens – 
bad reputation of philosophers and phi-
losophy in general. But Plato is aware of 
these circumstances. On top of that, for 
the majority of Athenians philosophy 
was regarded as completely devoid of 
any instrumental value for the society. 
The tragic predicament of philosophy 
and one of the most interesting moments 
in the Republic is Plato’s take on philoso-
phy through the mouth of Adeimantus, 
a follower of Socrates, acknowledging 
problematic reputation of philosophers 
and uselessness of philosophy in public 
life:
all those who take up philosophy… 
those who continue in it for a longer 
























to say completely bad, while the ones 
who seem best are rendered useless to 
the city because of the pursuit you rec-
ommended… How, then, it can be right 
to say that there will be no end to evils in 
our cities until philosophers – people we 
agree to be useless to cities – rule in 
them? (Republic, 487de)
Indeed. Actually, the very argument 
suggesting that philosophy is ill-equip -
ped for public life appears even earlier in 
the Gorgias, but it has also been repeated 
in the late dialogues, especially in the 
Theaetetus. Plato’s project in the Gorgias 
is to attempt to readdress the problem of 
the initial Socratic project that was 
doomed to end tragically in the Apology. 
Now Socrates is a figure willing to en-
gage in the public affairs even though he 
is aware that he would likely perish in 
this engagement. This philosophical 
project distances itself from the current 
politics led by those sophists who in-
dulge the masses performing just an 
imitation of politics. Socrates in the Gor­
gias says: “This is because the speeches I 
make on each occasion do not aim at 
gratification but at what’s best. They 
don’t aim at what’s most pleasant… But 
if I came to my end because of a defi-
ciency in flattering oratory, I know that 
you’d see me bear my death with ease” 
(Gorgias, 521de, 522d). Gorgias exposes 
the dead end of Socrates’s philosophiz-
ing. Socrates’ acknowledgment about 
the deficiency of philosophy reveals that 
philosophy lacks persuasiveness and as 
such is deemed useless not only for pub-
lic life, but also when a philosopher is 
confronted with political power. This is 
clearly shown by Socrates’ adversaries in 
the dialogue – Callicles in particular. But 
first, in the conversation with Polus, an-
other sophist, Socrates introduces a sur-
prising argument: philosophy is the 
most regarded craft in the city, a com-
plete opposite from oratory, and as such 
more powerful craft too, hence the “ora-
tors have the least power of any in the 
city”. Polus sarcastically and severely 
fires back: “Really? Don’t they [the ora­
tors], like tyrants, put to death anyone 
they want, and confiscate the property 
and banish from their cities anyone they 
see fit!” (Gorgias, 466bc). Socrates is 
shocked. The only way out for Socrates 
will be trying to redefine the meaning of 
“having power” by confusing Polus 
throughout the cross-examination. But 
Polus’ argument reveals the problem 
philosophy will be faced with – first, it is 
a craft completely ill-equipped for the 
challenges arising out of its public expo-
sure, and second, it is perceived as use-
less. In addition, Plato, through the 
mouth of Callicles, will enunciate the 
failures of Socrates’ philosophizing by 
pointing toward the tragic predicament 
of philosophy, echoing what is later re-
stated by Adeimantus in the Republic, as 
previously quoted. One of the arguments 
of Callicles’ attack on philosophy is that 
it although philosophic life can be re-
garded as “a delightful thing” (Gorgias, 
484c) for some, it appears to be political-
ly debilitating since it is obscure, solitary 
and, as such, confined to the private 
sphere, thus not fitted for the demands 
of public life. Philosophy is described as 
an endeavor suited only for a particular 
period of life – youth (Gorgias, 485a-c). 
Namely, practicing philosophy as an 
adult means being ill-fitted for the tasks 
the city since philosophy lacks political 
practicality. Callicles is going to scold 
philosophy fiercely:
When I see an older man still engaging 
in philosophy and not giving it up, I 
think such a man by this time needs 
flogging. For… it’s typical that such a 
man, even if he’s naturally very well fa-




































centers of his city and the marketplaces 
– in which according to the poet, men 
attain “preeminence” – and, instead lives 
the rest of his life in hiding, whispering 
in a corner with three or four boys, nev-
er uttering anything liberal, important, 
or apt (Gorgias, 485de).
Accordingly, the philosopher should 
be cured out of his philosophy if not for 
his own sake then for the sake of the city. 
If we, for a moment, disregard the image 
of Socrates challenging the very founda-
tion of the city and invoking political 
instability, the argument of ultimate use-
lessness of philosophy for public life, the 
view that philosophical life brings no 
good to the city, still stays relevant in the 
context and represents a serious obstacle 
for justifying the ends of philosophical 
dwelling. Furthermore, Callicles contin-
ues his diatribe on Socrates, here taken 
as a examplary philosopher, by showing 
the tragic consequences of this type of 
philosophizing: impotent in persuading 
anyone in the matters of public impor-
tance, as well as, persuading people in 
Socrates’ own matters in front on the 
court. As Plato implies:
Socrates… You couldn’t put a speech to-
gether correctly before councils of jus-
tice or utter any plausible or persuasive 
sound. Nor could you make any bold 
proposal on behalf of anyone else… 
don’t you think it’s shameful to be the 
way I take you to be, you and others who 
ever press on too far in philosophy? … 
“how can this be a wise thing, the craft 
which took a well-favored man and 
made him worse”, able neither to protect 
himself nor to rescue himself or anyone 
else from the gravest dangers, to be 
robbed of all property by his enemies, 
and to live a life with absolutely no right 
in his city? (Gorgias, 486bc).
Indeed, if you, as Adeimantus said to 
Socrates in the Republic, “have spent 
your whole life investigating this and 
nothing else” (Republic, 367de), and you 
fail in front of all, thus sealing-off your 
own destiny by being possibly executed 
and jeopardizing the craft itself – as in 
the case of the sailors and ship analogy 
that Plato deliberately introduces (Re­
public, 488c) – what conclusion can we 
make about this type of philosophizing? 
Not only that the perception from the 
Apology is confirmed – that Socrates 
makes people worse, not better – but we 
are also witnessing a depiction of philos-
ophy as impotent in its public usage, 
thus becoming aware of its ultimate fra-
gility in front of realities of political life, 
namely, when faced with power-strug-
gles. On top of it all, political power is 
capable of disposing with the lives of the 
subjects. Callicles bespeaks to Socrates 
by restating the argument introduced 
earlier by Polus: “this ‘imitator’”, as Calli-
cles mockingly refers to orators like 
himself, “will put to death, if he likes, 
your ‘non-imitator,’ and confiscate his 
property” (Gorgias, 511a). “I do know 
that”, Socrates calmly responds, “yes, 
he’ll kill him, if he likes, but it’ll be a 
wicked man killing one who’s admirable 
and good” (Gorgias, 511b). According to 
my view, what Socrates implies here is 
that philosophy and public life are in-
commensurable rather than just incom-
patible. Callicles judges philosophy from 
the perspective of political life or, more 
precisely, from the demands to use poli-
tics for pursuing mundane interests, the 
bodily pleasures in particular. He pre-
sents a conventional view of life that 
Socrates was opposed to. Callicles’ view, 
in fact, mirrors the view of Thrasyma-
chus from the Republic leading toward 
the conclusion that life of pleasure is 
better than any other alternative. Name-
ly, he equates what has been perceived as 
























should be accounted as superior as such 
(Gorgias, 489c). Socrates is going to ar-
gue that the standards of judging differ 
– even though for Socrates the judging 
that deals with the transient bodily 
pleasures cannot be on the equal footing 
with the one that favors the intransient 
pleasures of the soul, we see that So -
crates’ acceptance of his fate in his an-
swer to Callicles is linked with the differ-
ent standard of the good. If the philo-
sophic life is about to perish when 
confronted with the politically hostile 
environment, let it be, but this does not 
constitute the fact that death should be 
regarded as the greatest evil for the phi-
losopher. Rather, the greatest evil is not 
to perish but to act unjustly. Socrates, 
maintains that acting unjustly is always 
more severe than suffering injustice, 
namely the benefits of someone’s happi-
ness cannot trump the outcomes of an 
unjust life (Gorgias, 509cd). It is the soul 
that matters the most, not the body: “But 
if a man has many incurable diseases in 
what is more valuable than his body, his 
soul, life for that man is not worth liv-
ing” (Gorgias, 512a). In that sense, 
Socrates did not suffer from death, but 
from life, as Nietzsche pointed out, in-
terpreting his “last words” in a way that 
he was finally cured of a disease – in 
other words – life (Nietzsche, 1974: 272). 
However, in the Gorgias this care for 
the soul, i.e. philosophy, is surprisingly, 
equated with politics (Gorgias, 464b). 
Therefore, Socrates shockingly announ-
ces: “I believe that I’m one of a few Athe-
nians – so as not to say I’m the only one, 
but the only one among our contempo-
raries – to take up the true political craft 
and practice true politics” (Gorgias, 531d). 
But this is not the same Socrates charac-
ter from the earlier dialogues whose 
“divine sign” diverts him from practic-
ing politics. Here we have a “modified 
Socrates” redefining politics, claiming 
that he actually practices “true politics” 
in comparison with those “imitators” of 
the political craft. What this “Socrates” 
introduces here is actually the dawn of 
Plato’s political project – the attempt to 
bring together philosophy and politics 
together- whose peak is the Republic.
Plato’s project of making philosophy 
political
As we have seen, “Socratizing” Ath-
ens had subversive political implications. 
In the Republic Plato implies that So -
crates’ philosophical project has always 
been doomed to failure because of its 
subversiveness – it contains the seed of 
its own destruction including destruc-
tion of the city as well. But, philosophy 
cannot be left adrift on the margins of 
the city. Plato will make a radical turn in 
addressing the problem of the city and 
philosophy proclaiming: “How a city can 
engage in philosophy without being de-
stroyed… (therefore)… I am going to 
argue that a city should practice philoso-
phy in the opposite way to the present 
one” (Republic, 497de). In other words, 
philosophy has to become political and 
play a crucial role in public life. It has to 
rule the city, not turning the city into its 
enemy. Therefore, Plato is going to make 
the city safe for philosophy.
Unlike historic Socrates, Plato’s po-
litical project is going to be foundation-
al. Its aim is to reestablish the city in a 
way that will fuse both philosophy and 
politics together, and this fusion will 
culminate in the concept of the philoso-
pher-king. But before that we witness a 
transformation from one philosophical 
program to other. Namely, the end of 
book I of the Republic corresponds with 
the end of the aporetic elenctic encoun-




































the mouth of Socrates, has a different 
mission – the elenchus as an indefinite 
search for truth is incompatible with the 
process of founding the ideal city. Aside 
from being potentially subversive, the 
elenchus has never resulted in anything 
useful for public life. In other words, 
Socrates has never offered an institu-
tional framework for his educational ef-
forts. Now the Platonic Socrates is in-
volved in developing a theory along with 
those, such as Glaucon and Adeimantus, 
who are willing to join the founding pro-
ject as his disciples. From now on, this 
Platonic Socrates is not going to deal 
with the conversational opponents any-
more, but rather with conversational 
partners who were already in agreement 
with his view. The conversation is not 
conducted as a process of cross-exami-
nation and refutation. Glaucon and 
Adeimantus are not defending their own 
views, but rather pushing (Plato’s) 
Socrates to refute a certain common 
view of justice recognized as problemat-
ic but attractive to the most, in order to 
build up a new institutional foundation 
for the city. In other words, the dialogue 
should lead to something constructive. 
Plato cannot allow for the aporetic out-
comes anymore. People cannot be trust-
ed to arrive at the truth without a proper 
and clearly specified education facilitat-
ed through the polis. Now, the truth and 
the notion of justice, outlined and 
shaped by Plato and his disciples, have 
to be filtered through the city, not 
through the philosopher’s (Socrates’) 
mind. Questioning of the truth and jus-
tice is not allowed. In other words, phi-
losophy as the enterprise of genuine 
questioning of everything and everyone 
is not allowed anymore. Plato is going to 
be a harbinger of death of philosophy in 
the sense Socrates defined it. For exam-
ple, the work of poets should be syn-
chronized with the city or forbidden: 
“we must put a stop to such stories; if we 
do not, they will produce in our young 
people a very casual attitude to evil” (Re­
public, 392a). Furthermore, the citizens 
should be exposed to rigorous musical 
training so the lawlessness would not be 
able to penetrate through music “be-
cause rhythm and harmony permeate 
the innermost element of the soul, affect 
it more powerfully than anything else” 
(Republic, 401d).
However, despite the proposed edu-
cational program, and its accompanied 
politics of breeding (eugenics) that 
ought to lay foundations for the rise of 
the philosopher-king in what seems to 
be a properly prepared social and politi-
cal soil, it looks like Plato ultimately 
submits to the tragic view that acknowl-
edges “the insanity of the masses”. 
Namely, the masses are so resilient to 
education and discipline, so the philoso-
pher-king will not be able to thrive even 
in these new socio-political circum-
stances, and no philosopher will have 
any incentive to participate in public life. 
Actually, after proper training Plato’s 
guardian-philosopher will be obliged “to 
go down into the cave” (Republic, 539e), 
but the tragic outcome has yet to culmi-
nate. In this octroyed mission to dispel 
the world of shadows that shape the cave 
of political reality, the cave will likely 
devour him: “And as for anyone who 
tried to free the prisoners and lead them 
upward, if they could somehow get their 
hands on him, wouldn’t they kill him?”, 
asks Socrates, and Glaucon confirms – 
“They certainly would” (Republic, 517a).
Therefore, as a result of this intrinsic 
fragility of philosophy in front of the re-
ality of public life, Plato’s philosopher- 
king would be a normative ideal rather 
than a possibility. In dealing with the 
























philosopher can choose between a cou-
ple of possible surviving strategies, yet 
all of them are going to be inhospitable 
for philosophy. First option is the exile 
(Republic, 496b). Second is being quiet, 
or concealed from the public. He has to 
choose an apolitical life of “living in a 
small city” and disdaining “the city’s af-
fairs” (Republic, 496b). Socrates adds:
they have also seen the insanity of the 
masses and realized that there is nothing 
healthy, so to speak, in public affairs, and 
that there is no ally with whose aid the 
champion of justice can survive; that in-
stead he would perish before he could 
profit either his city of his friends, and be 
useless both to himself and to others – 
like a man who has fallen among wild 
animals and neither is willing to join 
them in doing injustice nor sufficiently 
strong to oppose the general savagery 
alone. Taking all this into his calcula-
tions, he keeps quiet and does his own 
work, like someone who takes refuge 
under a little wall from a storm of dust 
or hail driven by the wind. Seeing others 
filled with lawlessness, the philosopher 
is satisfied if he can somehow lead his 
present life pure of injustice and impious 
acts (Republic, 496cd).
However, there is the third option 
too, but it looks unrealistic on the politi-
cal horizon of any sort. It presupposes 
thriving in a proper constitutional set-
ting where “his own growth will be fuller 
and he will save the community, as well 
as himself ” (Republic, 497a). But as Plato 
himself admits, this is unlikely because 
there are no viable constitutions in the 
current political settings suitable for 
philosophy: “There is not one city today 
with a constitution worthy of the philo-
sophic nature… It is like foreign seed 
sown in alien ground: it tends to be 
overpowered and to fade away into the 
native species” (Republic, 497b). Discon-
tented with everything, practically ad-
mitting the failure of his political project 
too, Plato’s vision is gloomy. Even if this 
would not be the case, even if the public 
soil would be fertile for philosophy, ac-
cording to Plato, there should be two 
complementary preconditions for a phi-
losopher-king to rise – chance and com-
pulsion:
No city, no constitution, and no individ-
ual man will ever become perfect until 
some chance event compels those few 
philosophers who are not vicious (the 
ones who are now called useless) to take 
care of a city whether they are willing to 
or not, and compels the city to obey 
them – or until a true passion for true 
philosophy flows by some divine inspi-
ration into the sons of the men now 
wielding dynastic power of sovereignty, 
or into the men themselves (Republic, 
499b).
It is completely unclear what kind of 
chance would set up an ideal constitu-
tion suitable for philosophy, or who 
would compel a philosopher to rule hav-
ing in mind the existential insecurity of 
such a venture. It seems like Plato sug-
gests the masses will eventually realize 
that they were wrong and thus, driven by 
an unexplainable spark of reason, would 
install the one who has previously been 
perceived as politically useless as well as 
subversive (Republic, 500e). But such 
political philosophy rests on a couple of 
paradoxes. First, in order for that to hap-
pen the masses, unhappy with the exist-
ing constitutional arrangements, would 
need to understand that the pleasures of 
the soul outweigh the pleasures of the 
body. However, the tension between 
these types of pleasures has never been 
reconciled in Plato’s political philosophy. 
On the contrary, the tension itself per-
petuates a never-ending hostility between 




































to’s standpoint, legitimizing the need for 
philosophy to keep in check political 
realm against disorder. The second para-
dox of Plato’s reasoning here is bizarre at 
least – the masses, according to Plato’s 
proposal, after surrendering themselves 
to the hands of philosophers would al-
low them to completely “re-paint” their 
characters: “They [philosophers] would 
take the city and people’s characters as 
their sketching slate, but first they would 
wipe it clean – which is not at all an easy 
thing to do” (Republic, 501a). As the 
world of politics primarily deals with the 
appearances, while philosophy’s de-
mands are much deeper and likely in-
commensurable, Plato’s project from the 
Republic fails, both philosophically and 
practically.
However, is it somehow possible to 
reconcile philosophy and politics, to 
make philosophy useful for public and 
political life as well as to make the city 
safe for philosophy? The key for answer-
ing this quandary might be found in 
Plato’s later dialogues. It is clear that 
Plato’s argument from the Theaetetus as 
well as from the Statesman differs from 
the project in the Republic. Interestingly, 
in the Statesman Plato basically aban-
dons a discussion about the role of phi-
losophy in public life. The project from 
the Republic is dismantled along with 
the philosopher-king ideal, to be re-
placed by the ideal of the statesman, or 
the “weaver-king” (Statesman, 310e), 
conceiving “that statesmanship is the art 
which is responsible for managing a 
state” (Statesman, 280a). In that respect, 
the analogy that fits managing the state 
the best is the analogy of weaving as a 
paradigm for statesmanship whose task 
“is the production of the city, under-
stood as the artifact that protects us 
from the conflicts that result from our 
imperfect ‘tameness’ or ‘sociality’” (Már-
 quez, 2012: 51). Thus, the premise of 
Plato’s argument in the Statesman is the 
impossibility of the so-called “clean 
slate” Plato was idealizing about in the 
Republic. The project is more realistic. 
The “true statesmanship”, as Plato calls it, 
takes different people’s constitutions like 
the weaver carefully takes different threads 
combining, separating, and interweav-
ing them together into one tapestry:
The point is that the only task the weav-
er-king has to do, the sum total of his 
work, is to ensure that restrained and 
courageous characters never drift apart; 
he has to weave them together by having 
them share beliefs, respect and disre-
spect the same quantities, and betroth 
their children to one another. He has to 
form them into an even and, we might 
say, well-textured fabric, and never allow 
positions of power in the state to be held 
by one or other type exclusively (States­
man, 310e).
In dealing with the tensions between 
philosophy and public life, aside from 
the “weaver-king” solution from the 
Statesman, Plato offers another possibil-
ity in the Theaetetus. There, his implied 
criticism of philosophy outlines again 
that demands of political life require an 
effective decision-making process and 
political proficiency that philosophy is 
unable to deliver. We are told that phi-
losophy needs time for deliberation while 
at the same time lacks experience in 
dealing with public affairs. Plato recalls 
the problems of the Socratic project ad-
mitting that philosophy is ill-equipped 
for dealing with the matters of public 
life. As we have seen in the Apology and 
the Gorgias, the world of politics is not 
led by truth, rather by power and the 
imitation of truth masked behind in-
dulging and mellifluous rhetoric. The 
fragility of philosophy is predicated by 
























devotion that has been highly valuable 
among true philosophers is not of any 
value in political activities. The Theaete­
tus will confirm that view. According to 
my view, the Theaetetus is a final blow to 
philosophy in the way idealized and 
practiced by Socrates, as well as the 
proof that “the philosopher-king pro-
ject” is abandoned since here, according 
to Plato, evil cannot be eradicated with 
the rise of the philosopher-king. Name-
ly, “Socrates” from the Theaetetus argues 
that dualism of good and evil in the 
world cannot be overcome: “it is not 
possible… that evil should be destroyed 
– for there must always be something 
opposed to the good… it [evil] must in-
evitably haunt human life” (Theaetetus, 
176a).
Even though the maieutic method to 
some extent resembles the earlier elenc-
tic search for knowledge, Plato here im-
plicitly but severely (with a subtle aura of 
mockery) dismantles the Socratic philo-
sophical legacy. By depicting the fate of 
historical Socrates, Plato through the 
mouth of Socrates asks: “how natural it 
is that men who have spent a great part 
of their lives in philosophical studies 
make such fools of themselves when they 
appear as speakers in the law-courts” 
(Theaetetus, 172c). First of all, since for 
Socrates delivering philosophical ideas 
takes time, the philosopher will always 
lose in front of those skillful rhetoricians 
allying with political power. The concept 
of time is fundamental in Socrates’ un-
derstanding of philosophy and marks a 
necessay prerequisite for philosophiz-
ing. This is especially clear in the Apolo­
gy – “it is not easy to clear oneself of such 
grave allegations in a short time” (Apolo­
gy, 37b), but also in other works, for ex-
ample in the Theaetetus where Socrates 
explains that, unlike “the man of the 
law-courts”, the philosopher needs “plen-
ty of time. When he talks, he talks in 
peace and quiet, and his time is his 
own… It does not matter to such men 
whether they talk for a day or a year… 
But the other – the man of the law-courts 
– is always in a hurry when he is talking” 
(Theaetetus, 172d). It is suggested again 
that philosopher is unable to persuade 
others, namely that his craft is useless for 
anything else, but certain self-indul-
gence. Second, philosophy lacks experi-
ence in public affairs and as such it is 
ill-equipped for politics. Paradoxically, 
philosophy is able to rethink the nature 
of reality, but not to deal with something 
at hand, namely the nature of political 
reality. Thus, in one of the most striking 
paragraphs of the Theaetetus, Plato 
brings up the story about Thales as an 
allegory of the life of a philosopher, the 
story that should be read, in my view, as 
an allegory of Socrates, or a warning 
about how not to practice philosophy:
they say Thales was studying the stars… 
and gazing aloft, when he fell into a well; 
and a witty and amusing Thracian serv-
ant-girl made fun of him because, she 
said, he was wild to know about what 
was up in the sky but failed to see what 
was in front of him and under his feet. 
The same joke applies to all who spend 
their life in philosophy. It really is true 
that the philosopher fails to see his next-
door neighbor; he doesn’t only notice 
what he is doing; he scarcely knows 
whether he is a man or some other kind 
of creature… On all these occasions… 
the philosopher is the object of general 
derision, partly for what men take to be 
his superior manner, and partly for his 
constant ignorance and lack of resource 
in dealing with the obvious (Theaetetus, 
174ab, 175b).
So, what is the solution, if any, in the 
Theaetetus to reconcile philosophy with 




































particular? According to my view, the 
answer can be found in the concept of 
philosophy as midwifery (maieutike). 
The midwife analogy allows the preser-
vation of the philosophical enterprise as 
well as positioning the philosopher into 
the fabric of the city as someone able to 
lead youth in their preparation for the 
civic life. The purpose of the philosophi-
cal midwifery is that the philosopher 
helps “to determine whether the young 
mind is being delivered of a phantom, 
that is, an error, or a fertile truth” (The­
aetetus, 150c). This is completely altered 
philosophical and educational project 
from anything previously articulated by 
Plato8 The philosopher is going to tutor 
previously selected students in order to 
help them deliver their own ideas. This is 
a noticeable shift from the early elenctic 
dialogues where Socrates had been ag-
gravating his interlocutors, and the 
whole elenchus was far from tutoring of 
the best, but rather an intense outwitting 
usually with Socrates’ antagonists. This 
is also opposed to what we witness in the 
Republic where we have an imposed ed-
ucational program, as well as those dis-
ciples willing to follow, yet not those 
willing to learn, as is the case with young 
Theaetetus.
It seems that this maieutic Plato’s 
project in the Theaetetus allows politics 
and philosophy, even if incommensura-
ble in valorizing reality, to coexist. Fur-
8 As Burnyeat clarifies, we have, on the one 
hand, the sophist who “treats his pupil as an 
empty receptacle to be filled from the out-
side with the teacher’s ideas,” and on the 
other hand, Socrates who “respects the pu-
pil’s own creativity, holding that, with the 
right kind of assistance, the young man will 
produce ideas from his own mind and will 
be enabled to work out for himself whether 
they are true or false” (Burnyeat, 1992:56). 
thermore, it is the project that opens up 
a possibility for philosophy to educate 
for statesmanship. In other words, Pla-
to’s project from the Theaetetus grows 
out of his own critique of a philosopher 
who is preoccupied with useless and ir-
relevant pursuits, as depicted through 
the anecdote about Thales. It turns into 
the vision in which philosophy, if not 
highly praised or deeply integrated in 
institutions, can become useful for the 
city, and as such finally melded in the 
city’s fabric. According to my view, “the 
philosopher-midwife project” shows not 
only that philosophy is possible, even if 
this would not be easy, in the existing 
constitutional framework where it can 
spark the interest in knowledge and jus-
tice within those selected and rare young 
men willing to learn, but also in prepar-
ing them for the future in the city. In 
fact, Plato’s maieutic and tutoring ap-
proach from the Theaetetus can be seen 
as a vision of philosophy and public life 
weaved together and as such able to 
forge either philosophically educated 
‘midwives’, as in the case of Plato’s disci-
ple Aristotle, or philosophically trained 
statesmen, as in the case of Aristotle’s 
student Alexander the Great. Seeing the 
tragic predicament of philosophy, Plato 
knew, to paraphrase on Nietzsche, how 
to pick the philosophy’s spear and throw 
it onward from the point where Socrates 
had left it.9
9 Nietzsche’s original reference is actually to 
the Greeks who, according to his view, had 
moved onward philosophical thinking in 
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Filozofija i politika: anti-politički karakter Sokratove filozofije  
i Platonov projekt kojim filozofija postaje političkom
SaŽetaK Namjera ove studije je pojasniti posljedice Sokratove filozofije za razumijevanje 
odnosa između filozofije i politike, njihove međusobne tenzije i Sokrata kao neprijatelja 
naroda. autor istražuje tenziju između filozofije i javnoga života usporedbom dva suprot-
stavljena filozofska projekta – one Sokrata i Platona – pojašnjavajući različite metode i 
smjerove koje slijede u svojem shvaćanju filozofije i politike. autorova je tvrdnja da je So-
kratova filozofija antipolitička i subverzivna, beskorisna za javni život, te vodi političkoj 
nestabilnosti i, kako Platon otkriva u svojim dijalozima, tragično osuđena na propast u 
susretu s političkom moći. S druge strane, Platonov politički projekt, uz sve njegove kon-
tradikcije, neuspjehe i preokrete, predstavlja radikalni zaokret od Sokratove filozofije. 
radi se o projektu osnivanja grada na novim političkim temeljima, pokušavajući učiniti fi-
lozofiju političkom, a grad siguran za filozofiju stalnom potragom za modus vivendijem iz-
među filozofije i politike.
KljUČNe rijeČi filozofija, antipolitičko, subverzivno, nestabilnost, Sokrat, Platon
